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Contributions of NATO, EU and OSCE to European Security: 
Threats and Risks
Ψ 
 
 
 
When I look at Afghanistan,  
I see NATO playing the principal  
role in security assistance, and  
the EU playing a major role  
in financial assistance.
1 
  
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As the logic of democracy and free markets spreads throughout Central and Eastern Europe in 
the 1990s, the concept of security consequently evolved to encompass new challenges derived 
from the end of the Cold War. Ever since, the debate about security has focused on the subject 
and the referential object.  The former entails an inquiry into whether individuals, groups, states, 
regions or the global community are the most relevant actors to be protected. The latter reflects 
on what issues should be considered as part of security, namely, environmental, military or 
economic, among others. This pluralistic trend set out the premises for the reformation of 
international security studies
2 and, to some extent, for the “over-securitization” and “terrorist-
ization” of the international agenda as a result of 9/11. 
 
  The debate on security has opened up various avenues of analysis.  In order to delimit 
them, two criteria are taken into consideration.  First, agents seek “freedom from threats to core 
values,”
3 which is one of the most basic definitions of security; as a result, each agent faces a 
different type of insecurity. For instance, security at the domestic level “is provided through a 
                                                           
Ψ A previous version of this paper was presented at 46
th International Studies Association Convention, March 1-5, 
2005, Honolulu, Hawaii. I thank the comments and suggestions made by Bruce Bagley, Alejandro Chanona, Aimee 
Kanner and Nuray Ibryamova.  
1 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech to the Cambridge Union Society, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2, 2005. 
2 Khatchik Derghoukassian, After Renaissance: The Reformation of International Security Studies in the Post Cold 
War, paper presented at the 42
nd International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans, May, 2002. 
3 John Baylis, “International and Global Security in the Post-Cold War Era,” in The Globalization of World Politics. 
An Introduction to International Relations, eds. John Baylis and Steve Smith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001, 254.   2
mixture of legal mechanisms and insurance policies.  No such mechanisms exists when it comes 
to external threats to the state.”
4 Thus, the present paper focuses on the contributions of 
European (transatlantic) institutions (European Union, NATO and OSCE) to regional security.  
Second, it argues that the themes included in the security agenda are determined not only by 
official discourses, but also by the institutional strategies and policies aimed at deterring 
countering threats.  
 
Security, threats and risks 
Since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, international security has been associated with states. 
Intrinsically linked to them, war was a sanctioned phenomenon that developed rules and norms 
to ensure combatants’ behavior remained within certain limits. At the end of the Cold War, the 
European context was interpreted as favorably disposed to a new world order based upon an 
expanded community of democratic states. However, such high expectancies were soon followed 
by less optimistic predictions that the world was heading for a clash of civilizations. At the 
beginning of the XXI Century, the uncertainties of the new face of international terrorism 
boosted the view in the United States that, on behalf of its national security, “U.S. power should 
not be constrained by legal agreements, arms control treaties, or any détente-type relationship.”
5  
 
  The abrupt changes in the European context in a 15-year period have brought about 
distinct interpretations with regard to what security is. As a result of such steady transformations 
(end of Cold War, Yugoslavian Wars, September 11th and March 11th), the Copenhagen School 
of security studies have captured the gist of the current debate by proposing the theory of 
“de/securitization.”  Particularly relevant in this theory is the relative flexibility of adapting the 
concept of security depending on the relationship between the securitizing actor and the referent 
object.
6 This interaction is not exclusively deduced from some power calculations, nor as an 
                                                           
4 Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, eds., European Security After 9/11 (New York: Ashgate, 2004), 12. 
5 Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, 16. 
6 Ole Wæver states: “This is the core of the theory of securitization. Internationally (and increasingly in other 
contexts), the meaning of security is what it does: someone (a securitizing actor) points to a development or 
potentiality claiming that something or somebody (the referent object) with an inherent right to survive is 
existentially threatened, and therefore extraordinary measures (most likely to be wielded by the securitizing actor 
himself) are justified.” Ole Wæver, “Peace and Security. Two Concepts and their Relationship,” in Contemporary 
Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, eds. Stephano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung (New York: 
Routledge, 2004), 56.   3
arbitrary subjective phenomenon, but it is confined by shared understanding, political action and 
legitimatization, namely, intersubjectivity.
 7 
 
  If Europe as a region has undergone dramatic transformations during the past 15 years, 
what is the legitimate shared understanding of security from the perspective of European 
institutions? In other words, how have European institutions transformed their policies and 
objectives in order to face the changing nature of the sources of insecurity? In order to elicit a 
response, two categories are proposed: insecurity as a threat and insecurity as a risk.  
 
  The perception of threat has been central to most definitions of security. Even from the 
perspective of (de)securitization theory, threat plays a key role. In the words of one of its main 
proponents, securitization is “the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with 
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects.”
8 In this regard, traditionally the concept 
of threat has been commonly employed to describe a situation in which three elements come 
together. “First, the threat must emanate from an identifiable actor; second, this actor must have 
or be perceived to have an aggressive intention; and finally, this actor must have the ability to 
carry out its intentions.”
9 In other words, where a state’s leaders regard it as facing a probability 
that another state will either launch an attack or seek to threaten military force for political 
reasons, it faces a threat. This traditional definition of threat practically prevailed during the Cold 
War period. 
                                                           
7 In this regard, Guzzini states: “….processes of ‘de/securitization.’… (do) not understand security as an objective 
phenomenon which could be deduced from some power calculations, nor as an arbitrary subjective phenomenon. By 
concentrating not on what exactly security means and is, but rather on what invoking security does, it argues that 
whatever security (or national interest) is invoked, i.e. when issues are securitized, particular issues are taken out of 
regular politics and made part of a special agenda with special decision-making procedures and justifications 
attached to it. National security mobilizes intersubjectively shared dispositions of understanding, political action and 
legitimatization. In reverse, and this shows the initial puzzle which prompted the conceptualization, if issues are 
taken out of national security, if they are de-securitized, then politics can return to its place.” Stefano Guzzini, The 
Cold War is what we make of it,” in Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen Peace Research, 48. 
8 Barry Buzan, Ole Weaver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1998), 25.  
9 Carsten Tams, “The Functions of a European Security and Defense Identity and Its Institutional Form,” in 
Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, eds. Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane and 
Celeste Wallander, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 82.   4
  When no such threat exists, either because states do not have the intention or the 
capability to harm the security of others, states may nevertheless face a security risk.
10  In that 
perspective, NATO’s “enlargement and transformation have been driven primarily by political 
imperatives—that is, not by a sense of direct threat, but by an environment-shaping agenda of 
democratization and integration.”
11 This is why it is important to revisit the concept of risk, 
which has been melting away as a result of the generalized use of threat in the language of 
security after 9/11. In fact, “society’s reflections on itself are increasingly in terms of risk (risk 
society). More and more dangers are the product of our own actions, and fewer and fewer 
attributable to forces completely external to us.”
12 
 
  Thus, in order to avoid the abuse and manipulations of current threats in Europe, it is 
worth saying that not all challenges to security can be understood as threats since not all of them 
affect the “survival of identity, basic structures or vital functions.”
13 As mentioned above, a risk 
society has emerged since the early 1990s, whereas some threats of the Cold War mentality 
persist (weapons of mass destruction) and some other threats, which are diffuse in their 
manifestations (terrorism), have taken new forms. This is the case of the “war on terror” as a new 
type of war, which is an ongoing war against a largely invisible enemy, an enemy that does not 
recognize the norms and customs associated with the modern conception of war, traditionally 
associated with states.
14 
 
  In light of the transformation of the challenges to security, regional institutions (NATO, 
EU, OSCE) cope with security threats, creating rules, norms and procedures to enable their 
members to identify threats and manage (and where possible to retaliate against) them. Likewise, 
in the case of risks, institutions also have created mechanisms to cope with security risks in order 
                                                           
10 Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions,” in Imperfect Unions. 
Security Institutions over Time and Space, 25.  
11 Thomas S. Szayna, NATO Enlargement 2000-20015. Determinants and Implications for Defense and Planning 
Shaping (Santa Monica CA: RAND, 2001), xiii. 
12 Ole Wæver, “Peace and Security. Two Concepts and their Relationship,” in Contemporary Security Analysis and 
Copenhagen, 63. 
13 Morten Kelstrup, “Glozablization and Societal Insecurity,” Contemporary Security Analysis and Copenhagen 
Peace Research, Stephano Guzzini and Dietrich Jung, eds. (New York: Routledge, 2004), 108. With regard to 
security after September 11 in the Americas, see Alejandro Chanona, The New Security Agenda for the Americas: 
Challenges in the Aftermath of the War in Iraq, paper prepared for the presentation at the 45
th International Studies 
Association Convention, March 17, 2004, Montreal, Canada.  
14 Peter Shearman and Matthew Sussex, 13.   5
“to enable the members to provide and obtain information and to manage disputes in order to 
avoid generating security dilemmas.”
15 
 
Risks may become threats if they are not prevented timely. Whereas in the case of 
threats, the likelihood of being affected is immediate, risks emerge from actors that do not 
intentionally intend to harm other entities. Nonetheless, risks still may undermine security in a 
region. Myriam A. Dunn has explained this argument as follows:  
 
What all this points to is that the traditional Cold War understanding of 
threat as something imminent, direct, and certain no longer captures the 
nature of threats today. To remedy this, some researchers have proposed to 
pre-empt the word risk for the threats of the modern world, because it 
seems to capture the unsubstantiated characteristics of modern threats 
better…. According to the tenets of risk sociology, risks are indirect, 
unintended, uncertain, and are by definition situated in the future…
16 
 
  In this regard, in order to substantiate the concept of security in Europe, this paper makes 
the following assumptions, which are organized in the table below. First, insecurity is created by 
agents, which are clearly identifiable in some cases (states), whereas in others they are diffuse 
(terrorism). Second, the actions of agents may or may not affect other entities; agents will 
threaten others’ security when they intentionally inflict damage, whereas they will risk others’ 
security when they unintentionally and indirectly affect a third party. The use of instruments is 
vital in the explanation of the sources of insecurity. For instance, an ethnic group has the option 
of either searching peaceful coexistence with other groups or practicing ethnic cleansing. Either 
decision will have a different effect for domestic and external entities, which is the fourth 
premise: the effects on the security of Europe. In this case, there are several definitions of 
Europe, however, since this essay is mostly concerned with the performance of regional 
institutions, Europe is understood as the “Europe of regional institutions,” specifically through 
the membership to NATO and/or EU. Certainly, the contribution of the OSCE to the European 
security is significant; however, this 55 member organization comprises countries in Central 
Asia, which are not considered within the “European family.” Finally, threats and risks demand 
                                                           
15 Keohane, 26 
16 Myriam A. Dunn, What the Epistemic Communities Approach Can Contribute to the Study of Threat Politics, 
paper prepared for the presentation at the 46
th International Studies Association Convention, March 1-5, 2005, 
Honolulu, 4.   6
responses from regional organizations. Such responses will vary depending upon the policies of 
the regional organizations. 
   7
 
Sources of insecurity in Europe  
Agent Type  of 
insecurity 
Instruments Impacts  on 
Europe 
Regional 
institutions/w 
policies  
Terrorist 
groups 
Threat Weapons  of  mass 
destruction; 
conventional 
weapons 
Massive casualties  NATO-EU-
OSCE 
Organized 
Crime 
Threat Financial  resources 
Selective 
intimidation 
Corruption 
Social dislocation 
Drug and human 
trafficking 
 
EU 
Ethnic and 
religious  
intolerant 
groups  
Risk/Threat Racism 
Ethnic cleansing of 
rival groups 
Waves of migration 
Spillover of 
instability 
 
OSCE-EU-
NATO 
Migrants Risk    Informal  economy 
Identities  
EU-OSCE 
Failed 
states 
Risk Political 
persecution, human 
rights violation 
 OSCE-EU 
Natural 
Disasters 
Risk    EU 
 
 
Responses from Regional Institutions  
 
  One of the most important lessons of World War II was that European states need 
regional institutions to preserve stability on the old continent. Thus, institutions represent 
“persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, 
constrain states, and shape expectations.”
17  Europe has developed different types of institutions 
during the past five decades, forging international regimes, which “are defined as principles, 
norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actor expectations converge in a 
given issue-area. As a starting point, regimes have been conceptualized as intervening variables 
                                                           
17 Robert Keohane, “International Institutions: Two Approaches,” in International Theory. Critical Investigations, 
ed. James Der Derian (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 290.   8
standing between basic causal factors on the one hand and outcomes and behavior on the 
other.”
18 In this regard, NATO, the EU and the OSCE converge in the area of security.  
 
  The strength and weaknesses of regional institutions is a result of a consensus among the 
member states. Nonetheless, particularly in the case of the EU as an integration process, the mere 
existence of an institution will also influence the perceptions of the members. In the cases of the 
deepening of the EU and the military transformations of NATO, member states have agreed to 
adjust their domestic practices to the parameters set by themselves at the regional level. As far as  
the enlargement of both institutions is concerned, the transformational effects of the EU and 
NATO on candidate states is even more dramatic since they have to radically adopt and 
internalize new norms and practices in a short period of time. In this vein, based on Krasner, the 
role of institutions in the realm of European security entails four feedback mechanisms: “First, 
regimes may alter actors’ calculations of how maximize their interest. Second, regimes may alter 
interests themselves. Third, regimes may become a source of power to which international actors 
can appeal. Fourth, regimes may alter the power capabilities of different actors, including 
states.”
19  Taking into consideration these assumptions, what is the contribution of each one of 
these regional organizations to European security? 
 
NATO 
 
  NATO has undergone several transformations, particularly since the early 1990s. 
NATO’s traditional military job during the Cold War shifted from territorial defense towards 
peacemaking and, in the case of the Kosovo air campaign, some robust peacemaking. Certainly, 
the Soviet Pact constituted a threat with its latent aggressive intentions supported by a massive 
nuclear and conventional military machine. As today’s threats come from “a combination of 
failed states, terrorism, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,”
20 NATO has played a 
key role in preserving security in Europe, mainly through its enlargement process and the 
subsequent military transformation of the new members.  
 
                                                           
18 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1983), 1.  
19 Krasner, 361. 
20 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech to the Cambridge Union Society, Cambridge, United Kingdom, February 2, 2005.   9
  As mentioned above, institutions shape preferences and NATO has done so during the 
enlargement process. NATO’s rationale is reflected in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Program, 
which links 26 states to NATO, and the enlargements of 1999 and 2004, both designed to   
expand NATO’s leverage  in shaping the political and economic development of European 
countries where democracy and free markets were not yet taken for granted. In order to win 
NATO memberships in 1999 and 2004, the candidate countries agreed to long agendas of 
reforms, ranging from ensuring free press and fair elections to protecting minorities and acting 
against drug trafficking and corruption. Likewise, when the PfP was launched on January 10, 
1994, NATO demanded from candidate states the establishment of civil control over their 
armies, profound reforms of their soviet-era forces, and efforts to develop NATO-compatible 
militaries. For instance, in the prelude to the admission of new members, the policy of carrot and 
sticks was widely used. In 2002, the Bush administration warned Slovakia that it would not be 
admitted if it had allowed a nationalist former prime minister to return to office.
21  
 
  In addition to the military transformations in Eastern and Central Europe, there is an 
overhaul in the deployment of the United States forces in Europe, which would reduce the 
American military presence in Germany (78,000 troops) in favor of smaller, less costly bases in 
Eastern Europe (Poland, Romania, Bulgaria), which also are closer to the post-Cold War 
conflicts of today.
22  
  
  Some of NATO’s contributions to European security were the deployment of the 
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft in the United States after September 
11
th, in Turkey during early 2003
23 as well as at the Euro 2004 football championship in Portugal 
and at the 2004 Athens Olympics. 
 
  Derived from the different nature of threats and risks, NATO has been engaging in out of 
area operations and activities in order to prevent the spread of such challenges into the member’s 
                                                           
21 International Herald Tribune, “NATO’s welcome expansion,” April 8, 2002. 
22 Mark Lander, “NATO Chief Sees Shift of U.S. Forces in Europe,” New York Times, March 2003. 
23 “In response to the April 16, 2003 decision by NATO to end Operation Display Deterrence, General James L. 
Jones, Supreme Allied Commander Europe, today gave the order for the gradual reduction of NATO AWACS 
crews, the Patriot Fire Unit, and other support personnel deployed to Turkey… The Operation began on February 
26, 2003… Jones thanks the personnel to support our ally against the potential threat from Iraq.” U.S. Department of 
State, Forces were Deployed in February to Counter Potential Threat Form Iraq, Statement 910, April 22, 2003.   10
territory. The General Secretary of NATO has said that “at NATO, we have agreed that we must 
tackle these threats when and where they arise, otherwise they will end up on our doorstep, and it 
will be too late to deal with them effectively.”
24 This is the underlying reason that motivates 
NATO to deploy naval forces in the Mediterranean to monitor shipping and provide deterrent to 
terrorism at sea (Operation Active Endeavor).  
 
  The intergovernmental character of NATO makes it dependent on the ability of member 
states to reach consensus. Two recent events reflect how such agreements or the lack thereof can 
make possible NATO “out of area operations.” First, in the aftermath of September 11, NATO 
agreed to carry out its first mission beyond Europe’s frontiers in its 54-year history, when it took 
formal control of Afghanistan’s multinational peacekeeping force on August 11, 2003.
25 Thus, 
under UN mandate, NATO assists the Afghan government on security matters. However, it has 
been said that by “excluding NATO from America’s fledging war on terrorism does hold some 
advantages from the U.S. perspective. No longer does Washington need to seek the approval of 
all 25 allies for each and every step of the military campaign, as was the case in Kosovo.”
26 
 
  The second event can be observed in the individual participation of NATO members in 
the invasion and peace building in Iraq. Institutionally, NATO has a very modest participation in 
Iraq. Thus, on September 22, 2004, NATO ambassadors agreed  to create a military training 
academy in Iraq, raising the number of trainers from 40 to approximately 300. The initial 
decision to offer training was agreed to by the 26-nation alliance in June, 2004, and the NATO 
Training Assistance Implementation Mission was created in Iraq on July 30. However, as 
individual countries, other members have opted for a different approach. Spain, which pulled out 
                                                           
24 Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Speech to the Cambridge Union Society, Cambridge, United Kingdom,  
February 2, 2005 
25 Amy Waldman, “NATO Takes Control of Peace Force in Kabul,” New York Times, August 12, 2003.Until then, 
NATO had “already provided more than 90 percent of the troops for a 5,000-member International Security and 
Assistance Force in Afghanistan. But its decision to assume command of force is meant to lend continuity and 
stability to an operation that until now has been led by a new country every six months. Until then, the international 
community has had to search every six months for new nations to lead the mission. The search is over.” See also 
Todd Pitman, NATO to Command Peace Force in Kabul,” Washington Post, August 10, 2003. He states: “The force 
has been led by Britain and Turkey –and for the last six months jointly by Germany and the Netherlands—since it 
was created in December 2001 to bolster security in Kabul following the US-led war that toppled the Taliban 
government. The force’s mandate expires in June (2004), when nationwide elections are to be held to choose a new 
head of state.” 
26 Tomas Valasek, “The Fighting Against Terrorism: Where’s NATO?” World Policy Journal (Winter 2001-02): 19.  11
of Iraq in 2004, offered to train Iraqi soldiers near Madrid. Romania, with a pragmatic strategy of 
getting benefits from the reallocation of US troops in Europe, would train officers inside Iraq.  
France offered 20 million euros to train up to 1,500 Iraqi polices officers in Qatar or in France, 
whereas Belgium is also considering helping with training outside Iraq. Germany promised to 
train army officers in the United Arab Emirates.
27 Training of instructors will start in April 2005 
and courses begin in September. 
 
  With regard to other transformations within NATO, two are particularly relevant. First, 
the NATO Response Force is a rapidly deployable multinational unit made up of land, air, 
maritime and special forces components and will be able to start deploying after five days’ notice 
and sustain itself during operations lasting 30 days or longer.  The NRF prototype numbering 
9,500 was officially inaugurated on October 15, 2003, at the headquarters of the Joint Force 
Command in Brunssum, the Netherlands. The NRF achieved an initial operational capability in 
October 2004, with some 17,000 troops, and will grow to 24,000 when it reaches its full 
operational capability by October 2006.
28 The second transformation is the creation of NATO’s 
multinational chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) defense battalion, which is 
designed to respond to and manage the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction 
and the release of any CBRN inside and beyond NATO’s area of responsibility.
29  
 
EU 
 
Security is embedded in the integration process. The Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s 
was per se an institutional consensus to make war unfeasible.  Whereas the complex architecture 
of Europe expanded its scope of polices and countries and the end of the Cold War brought new 
challenges, the need for concrete security policies became more evident. Due to the uncertainty 
of the 1990s, the accession of the 10 new members in 2004 was strongly guided by the 
perception of promotion of stability through the free market and democracy. 
 
                                                           
27 Eric Schmitt and Judy Dempsey, “U.S. and NATO to bolster training for Iraqis,” International Herald Tribune, 
February 11, 2005. 
28 NATO, NATO Briefing, Brussels, December 2004, 9. 
29 NATO, NATO Briefing, Brussels, December 2004), 3.  12
  The peaceful revolutions in Eastern Europe in 1989 eliminated threats of massive-scale 
violence for the EU.  Instead, it brought risks resulting from  the uncertainties of the 
transformations in the region. Thus, the strategy taken by the Community/Union to address the 
internal sources of conflict reflect liberal ideas: Democracy, respect for human and minority 
rights, economic growth and integration would lead to stability and peace. Karen Smith states 
that “The EU is applying its own experiences with regards to Eastern Europe…. (In order to do 
so) the Community adopted two main approaches: it sets conditions for closer relations and 
eventual membership and it extended aid and technical assistance.”
30  In the case of external 
threats, the EU created the Pact on Stability in Europe and initiated a more active role in 
peacekeeping and peace-building. 
 
   Even though security concerns are hardly mentioned in the admission criteria, those play 
a prominent role in the enlargement process.
31 Thus, enlargement was presented as the 
mechanism intended to deal with the problems of peace and stability and the strategy chosen was 
designed on a liberal basis; however, the failures of the international community, particularly 
Europe, to face the burst of violence in the former Yugoslavia made evident the weakness of the 
integration process as a promise of stability.   
 
  The EU has been criticized for the lack of willingness to face hard security challenges. 
With pending reforms and developments on the EU agenda, from the St. Malo initiative 
onwards, the Council of the EU, following the guidelines established at the Cologne European 
Council (June 1999), the Helsinki European Council (December 1999) specifically decided to 
create a non-military management mechanism to coordinate and put to more effective use the 
various civilian means and resources in parallel with military resources.  Since then, three bodies 
have been put in place.  The first is the Political and Security Committee (PSC); PSC is 
responsible for political monitoring and strategic management of crisis management operations.  
The second is the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CIVCOM), which was 
created by decision of May 22, 2000, and is responsible for providing information, making 
                                                           
30 Karen E. Smith, The Making of EU Foreign Policy. The Case of Eastern Europe (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 
138. 
31 Nuray V. Ibryamova, Security, Borders, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, Jean 
Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series 4, no. 15, University of Miami, May 2004.  13
recommendations and giving its opinion to the PSC on civilian aspects of crisis management. 
The third is the Police Unit. It was created by the Nice European Council (December 2000) and 
is attached to the Council Secretariat.  
 
  The Nice European Council also approved the creation of three new permanent political 
and military bodies.
32 In addition to its civilian functions, the PSC sends guidelines to the 
Military Committee and receives its opinions and recommendations. The European Union 
Military Committee (EUMC) is the second military body.  It is the highest military body 
established within the Council. Finally, the European Union Military Staff provides military 
expertise and support to the ESDP, including the conduct of EU-led military crisis operations.     
 
In the same military area, under the Joint Council action in July 2001, the EU also 
decided to transfer two agencies from the WEU to EU structures, namely the Satellite Centre and 
the Institute of Security Studies, in order to support the Union in the context of CFSP and in 
particular the ESDP.   
 
  In the post-September 11
th context, the document A Secure Europe in a Better World 
(European Security Strategy) was adopted by the European Council in December 2003.  The 
ESS does not take the Cold War and its aftermath as its point of departure–indeed, it is hardly 
mentioned. Instead, the key reference is European integration which, it is claimed, “has 
transformed relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens.”
33 
 
  In contrast to previous security doctrines based almost exclusively on the military 
dimension, according to Helmut Kuhne, the ESS takes a holistic approach as reflected in the 
following phrase: “security is a precondition of development.”  In thus identifying the key threats 
to global security (terrorism, WMD, regional conflicts, failed states and organized crime), the 
ESS seeks to elucidate a wider concept of security drawing upon the role played by factors, 
which heretofore had not been considered as being of primary relevance to security policy. Also, 
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in acknowledging the destructive forces of poverty, malnutrition and disease and their 
deleterious effects on the stability of states and their societies, the ESS argues that only a mix of 
military capacities with civilian capabilities and know-how can be the basis for contributing to a 
more secure world.
34 
 
  In the medium and long term, the creation of the European Defense Agency is of the 
utmost relevance. Sparked by tensions over the Iraq war, which threatened to destabilize the 
CFSP, the European Defense Agency was created in November 2003, and funded in June 2004, 
several years earlier than originally planned.
35  
 
  Whereas the EU has finally created specific agents in the EU military sector in order to 
initiate a process of military convergence, some moderate steps have been taken with regard to 
military operations. One of the initial assessments states that, “the missions remain very limited 
in scope and depend heavily on the leadership and commitment of the major member states; are 
not complex operationally; the financing is limited and they have involved the participation of 
third states.”
36  Certainly, the first operations are quite modest, but they constitute concrete 
actions which would have been unthinkable a few years ago.  
 
  The European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched in January 
2003 and represents the EU’s first ever civilian crisis management operation under ESDP. The 
EU took over from the UN-led police mission in Bosnia Herzegovina, whose mandate was to 
monitor, mentor and inspect the local police force. The EUPM has a mandate for 3 years (until 
December 2005), with an annual budget of €38 million, of which €20 million are financed by the 
Community.
37 Four hundred forty two EU police officers participate in this mission.  
 
  Operation Concordia was launched on 31 March 2003 and was the first-ever military 
operation, in which the EU-NATO collaboration proved to work well.  This operation took place 
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in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), in which the EU used NATO assets 
and capabilities and where the EU Operation Commander was Deputy Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe. In the context of the EU-NATO relations, it is important also to add the 
CME-CMX03, which was a joint EU-NATO crisis managements exercise (19-25 November 
2003). Such exercises provide further experience assisting the consolidation of EU-NATO 
relations in crisis management. 
 
  The Concordia operation, requested by the FYROM and backed by United Nations 
Security Council resolution 1371, was expected to last six months.  Its initial budget was €6.2 
million, and 13 EU member states (all except Ireland and Denmark) and 14 non-member states 
contributed forces to the mission, totaling 350 armed personnel (308 from the EU). EUPOL 
Proxima in Macedonia succeeded Concordia in December 2003. The total cost of the mission 
amounts to €15 million for the first year.  
 
  Another important operation was Artemis.  This was an operation carried out in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, in which NATO was regularly and timely informed of the EU’s 
intentions, in full respect of the spirit and the letter of the Crisis Consultation Arrangements (12 
June-1 September 2003). In accordance with the mandate set out in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1484 (May 30, 2003), this operation sought to contribute to the stabilization of 
security conditions and the improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia, the Ituri capital. 
 
  As part of the continuing coordination with NATO, at the end of 2004 the EU took over 
the NATO-led mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its purpose is to create a viable, peaceful and 
multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina with a long-term prospect of EU membership.  In practice, 
this means that the EU and NATO have to work very closely together.  The European Union is 
not running the mission by itself but instead has access to NATO’s assets and planning, which 
are being conducted by the deputy head of the military division of NATO.  This gives the U.S. 
an overview of the operation, of which it was initially highly suspicious due to the possible 
intentions of some EU member states to run an independent mission in Bosnia once the EU took 
it over from NATO.
38 
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OSCE 
 
Originally conceived as a mechanism for fostering dialogue between East and West in the Cold 
War period, the OSCE reinvented itself to participate in the architecture of Europe by mostly 
monitoring political risks in a wide area that encompasses 55 countries.  Although ignored in 
several debates on security, the comprehensive approach of the OSCE  “seeks to deal with an 
unusually wide range of security-related issues, including preventive diplomacy, political-
military confidence and security building measures, arms control, human rights, democratization, 
election monitoring and steps to strengthen both economic and environmental security.”
39  In line 
with its documents, the tasks of the OSCE are threefold (known as the Helsinki baskets): security 
issues, economic, scientific, technology, and environmental issues; and human-dimension 
issues.
40 
 
  Unlike security military regional organizations such as NATO, the OSCE monitoring 
activities have developed the function of warning members about growing political risks as well 
as providing systematized information to exert pressure when members fail to live up the OSCE 
commitments. Despite the fact that the OSCE is a ‘soft’ security organization, its reports on 
elections and human rights, inter alia, contribute to the legitimization of the performance of its 
members in these areas. In fact, although OSCE peacekeeping capacities are limited, “the OSCE 
Chairman-in-office (rotating annual basis) may appeal to organizations like NATO or the EU 
(UN) to enforce sanctions on OSCE member states that deliberately and repeatedly violate 
OSCE norms and agreements.”
41 
 
  Currently, the OSCE’s 18 field missions are working to advance security, human rights 
and conflict resolution from the Balkans to Central Asia, the largest one being in Kosovo. The 
geography of the displayed missions reflects the fact that numerous former centralized 
economies and CIS countries are struggling to improve their democratic political performances -
                                                           
39 Craig G. Dunkerley, “Considering Security amidst Strategic Change: The OSCE Experience,” Middle East Policy 
XI, no. 3 (Fall 2004): 131. 
40 Nina Græger and Alexandra Novosseloff, “The Roles of the OSCE and the EU,” The United Nations and 
Regional Security. Europe and Beyond, eds. Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu (Boulder: Lynne Riener, 
2003), 81. 
41 Græger and Novosseloff, 82.  17
a situation which brings about discord particularly with Russia.  In January 2005, as a result of 
the active role of the OSCE in Ukraine and strong criticism from Sergei Lavrov, Russia’s foreign 
minister, the OSCE’s chairman-in-office stated: “I will not hide from you that there is a sense of 
crisis in the OSCE. The recent statements of dissatisfaction from the Russian Federation and 
some CIS countries must be taken seriously.”
42 In response, then Secretary of State Colin Powell 
declared that there are no double standards when it comes to OSCE election monitoring in CIS 
countries and recalled that Russia’s commitments to withdraw military forces from Moldova and 
to agree with Georgia on the duration of the Russian military presence there “remain 
unfulfilled.”
43  
 
  The disagreement between OSCE, on the one hand, and Russia and other CIS members, 
on the other, is basically due to the lack of progress in the area of political rights.  During 2004, 
the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) supported or was 
involved in 15 elections in Europe, North America (the 2004 electoral process in United States) 
and Central Asia. The most problematic reports were precisely in Central Asia. In some cases, 
such as Tajikistan (February 27, 2005), the OSCE severely criticized the entire electoral process, 
from legislative framework to actual vote tabulation. In other cases, such as Kazakhstan, the 
OSCE/ODIHR issued a report  on the electoral process in 2004; as a result, the United States 
urged Kazakhstan to amend its electoral law to address the shortcomings of the 2004 
parliamentary elections.
44 In the case of the electoral process in Uzbekistan in December 2004, 
the OSCE/ODIHR report considered that the elections fell significantly short of OSCE 
requirements. Moldova was not the exception and has been one of the extreme cases in which 
there is a strong claim demand from the United States, the EU and the OSCE for the government 
to reverse trends of “harassment of opposition leaders, biased coverage of public media, 
intimidation of civil society groups, and use of public resources for campaign purposes.”
45  
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  The electoral process in Ukraine at the end of 2004 was of particular relevance for the 
OSCE. In addressing the difficult political situation in the country following the disputed second 
round of the presidential election on 21 November, 2004, the OSCE’s electoral observer mission 
was its largest ever deployed by this organization. The repeat second round on 26 December 
showed a marked improvement in the electoral process, including fairer campaign conditions, a 
more transparent electoral administration, and more balanced media coverage.  As a result of the 
role of the OSCE, “the cautious congratulations by the EU,
46 Poland and Lithuania “were issued 
after the monitoring mission of the OSCE concluded that the elections were fairer than previous 
polls.”
47 
 
  Intrinsically related to democracy, respect for minorities is one of the key issues in the 
OSCE’s agenda. In addition to several institutional bodies created in the 1990s, under the 
Bulgarian OSCE Chairman in office (second half of 2004), and as a result of conferences held in 
Berlin, Paris and Brussels in 2004, the OSCE created special representatives to address anti-
Semitism (Combating Anti-Semitism), racism and discrimination (Combating Racism, 
Xenophobia and Discrimination), and anti-Muslim sentiments (Combating Intolerance and 
Discrimination against Muslims). 
 
  On the other hand, the OSCE has recently been working in the field of counter terrorism, 
particularly serving as a negotiation arena. Indeed, Terrence Hopmann states that  
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… the OSCE has identified its special niche in the struggle against 
terrorism primarily in doing what it had been doing all along—namely 
strengthening security through human dimension activities… In particular, 
the OSCE since 9-11 has increasingly emphasized the long-term conflict 
prevention activities associated with good governance and social 
integration as opposed to more immediate conflict prevention… Similarly, 
its focus has turned to these regions in Euroasia where democratic 
institutions area least visible.
48 
 
   In this regard, the OSCE Maastricht Ministerial Council in 2003 produced a number of 
action-oriented strategies against terrorism and considered “preventing and combating terrorism 
a top priority for all of us.”  With a pragmatic approach, the OSCE seems to be focused on 
negotiating and collaborating, particularly with the EU, on concrete areas such as airport 
security, policing, and secure travel documents.
49 Likewise, the OSCE held the first 
intergovernmental conference on Man-Portable air defense systems, or MANPADS, which are 
being sold on the black market in and around OSCE countries.
50 As a result of the interest in the 
area of combating terrorism, the OSCE’s unified budget grew from  €165.5 in 2003 to €180 in 
2004 (it is worth mentioning that the budget was €12 in 1993).
51   
 
  From the above-mentioned, it can be said that the OSCE’s broad conceptualization of 
security represents a clear example of the ability of institutions to shape state behavior. Although 
it is not always successful in carrying out its objectives, however, it advances state acceptance of 
the norms of democracy, human rights and cooperation on security-related issues.
52 
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Final Considerations 
 
NATO, the EU and the OSCE have undergone numerous transformations in order to manage 
current threats and risks to European security.  NATO has been able to have a modest but 
important participation in military operations (mainly peacekeeping) from former Yugoslavia to 
Afghanistan; simultaneously, both enlargements in 1999 and 2004 transformed the militaries of 
Eastern Europe according to NATO’s parameters in order to create military interoperability 
among its member states. The EU, on the other hand, has carried out a new enlargement in 2004 
under the liberal assumption of providing security by political and economic reforms in the new 
members; at the same time, it has begun a process of active military participation in 
peacekeeping operations, which is a good sign for the credibility of the EU as a security 
provider. The OSCE has also made a significant contribution through monitoring basic freedoms, 
warning about political crises, and enhancing cooperation to strengthen stability. 
 
  At first sight, the three institutions analyzed have clear-cut functions in the making of 
European security: NATO-military; EU-political-economic, and OSCE-political. However, in 
light of their institutional performances, it is clear that there is an overlap in their security 
activities, demanding transformations from all of them. After several years of political 
disagreements, the Berlin plus mechanism seems to pave the way for more efficient cooperation 
between NATO and the EU in peacekeeping operations. Likewise, the OSCE has also started 
some activities in order to contribute to the fight against terrorism and border security, which 
have to take place in close coordination with the EU and NATO.   
 
  It is expected that the debates about the reforms of the three institutions will strengthen 
the cooperation among them. With regard to the EU, the Constitutional Treaty points in the right 
direction, particularly with respect to the military area. On the other hand, although NATO 
seems to remain under the current dynamic, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder stated in 
February 2005 that NATO “has ceased to be the primary venue where transatlantic partners 
discuss and coordinate the most important strategic issues of the day,”
 53  and propose the 
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establishment of a high level panel to review the relationship, reporting to NATO and the EU 
leaders by 2006. In the case of the OSCE, there  are reforms in the pipeline with the 
establishment of a panel of Eminent Persons to review the OSCE and its functions, and expecting 
to receive the panel’s recommendations in June (2005) in order to “expand the OSCE’s political-
military, counter terrorism, and economic activities”
54 
 
  Whereas these processes in the realm of security are taking place, it has to be kept in 
mind that the prosperity gap between Eastern and Western Europe further compounds the 
necessity to provide financial as well as organizational support for these countries, as well as 
incentives for the successful completion of their political and economical transformations.
55 This 
may erode any attempt to reverse the current achievements in the field of European security and 
will lead reluctant countries such as Russia to be less suspicious and more cooperative in 
combating current threats and challenges for the security. This will avoid repeating one sad 
lesson of the twentieth century, that refusing to form alliances with defeated adversaries is more 
dangerous than forming such alliances.
56 
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